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For a hidden variable theory to be indistinguishable from quantum theory for finite precision
measurements, it is enough that its predictions agree for some measurement within the range of
precision. Meyer has recently pointed out that the Kochen-Specker theorem, which demonstrates
the impossibility of a deterministic hidden variable description of ideal spin measurements on a spin
1 particle, can thus be effectively nullified if only finite precision measurements are considered. We
generalise this result: it is possible to ascribe consistent outcomes to a dense subset of the set of
projection valued measurements, or to a dense subset of the set of positive operator valued measure-
ments, on any finite dimensional system. Hence no Kochen-Specker like contradiction can rule out
hidden variable theories indistinguishable from quantum theory by finite precision measurements in
either class.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The experimental evidence against local hidden vari-
able theories is compelling and fundamental theoretical
arguments weigh heavily against those non-local hidden
variable theories proposed to date, but the question of
hidden variables is still interesting for at least two rea-
sons.
First, we want to distinguish strongly held theoretical
beliefs from established facts. Since there are reasonably
sound (though clearly not universally persuasive) theo-
retical arguments against every interpretation of quan-
tum theory proposed to date, we need to be particu-
larly cautious about distinguishing belief from fact where
quantum foundations are concerned. In particular, we
still need to pin down precisely what types of hidden
variable theories can or cannot be excluded by particular
theoretical arguments.
Second, recent discoveries in quantum information the-
ory and quantum computing give new interest to some
foundational questions. For example, we would like to
know in precisely what senses a quantum state carries
information and can be regarded as a computer, and how
it differs in these respects from classical analogues. From
this perspective, as Meyer [1] has emphasized, questions
about the viability of hidden variable models for a par-
ticular process translate into questions about the clas-
sical simulability of some particular aspect of quantum
behaviour, and are interesting independently of the plau-
sibility of the relevant models as physical theories.
Either way, we need to distinguish arguments based
on idealised measurements, which can be specified pre-
cisely, from arguments based on realistic physical mea-
surements, which are always of finite precision. Since
we cannot precisely specify measurements, it is conceiv-
able that all the measurements we can carry out actually
belong to some subset of the full class of measurements
allowed by the quantum formalism. That subset must
be dense, assuming that any finite degree of precision
can be attained in principle, but it need not have posi-
tive measure. Any no-go theorem relying on a model of
measurement thus has a potential loophole which can be
closed only if the theorem still holds when measurements
are restricted to a dense subset. From the point of view
of quantum computation, the precision attainable in a
measurement is a computational resource: specifying in-
finite precision requires infinite resources and prevents
any useful comparison with discrete classical computa-
tion.
We consider here whether the predictions of quantum
theory can be replicated by a hidden variable model in
which the outcomes of measurements are pre-determined
by truth values associated to the relevant operators. We
first review the case of infinite precision with standard
von Neumann, i.e. projection valued, measurements.
The question then is whether there is a consistent way
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of ascribing truth values p(P ) ∈ {0, 1} to the projections
in such a way as to determine a unique outcome for any
projection valued measurement. That is, is it possible to
find a truth function p such that if {Pi} is a projective
decomposition of the identity then precisely one of the
Pi has truth value 1? To put it formally, does there exist
a truth function p such that
∑
i
p(Pi) = 1 if
∑
i
Pi = I ? (1)
The Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem [2–4] shows that
the answer is no for systems whose Hilbert space has
dimension greater than two. The general result follows
from the result for projections in three-dimensional real
space, and so can be proved by exhibiting finite sets of
projections in R3 for which a truth function satisfying (1)
is demonstrably impossible. Kochen and Specker gave
the first example [3] of such a set, and some simpler ex-
amples were later found by Peres. [6,7] An independent
proof was given by Bell, [2] who noted that, by an argu-
ment of Gleason’s, [5] (1) implies a minimal finite separa-
tion between projectors with truth value 1 and 0, which
is impossible since both values must be attained.
We could ask the same question about positive oper-
ator valued measurements. That is, does there exist a
truth function p on the positive operators such that
∑
i
p(Ai) = 1 if
∑
i
Ai = I ? (2)
Obviously, since projection valued measurements are spe-
cial cases of positive operator valued measurements, the
KS theorem still applies.
Returning to the case of projections, we want to know
whether the restriction to finite precision could make a
difference. Our hypothesis, recall, is that a finite preci-
sion measurement could correspond to a measurement of
some particular projective decomposition in the precision
range, a decomposition whose projections do indeed have
hidden pre-assigned truth values. The relevant question
then is: is there a physically sensible truth function p
defined on a dense subset S1 of the space of all projec-
tions such that (1) holds on a dense subset PD1 of the
space of all projective decompositions? This requires in
particular that the set S2 of projections belonging to de-
compositions in PD1 must satisfy S2 ⊆ S1. By physically
sensible, we mean that the subsets S3 and S4 of projec-
tions P in S2 for which p(P ) = 1 and p(P ) = 0 respec-
tively are both dense in the space of all projections, so as
to avoid the possibility of contradiction by experiments
of sufficiently high precision.
We first consider the case treated in the proof of the KS
theorem, one-dimensional projections on R3. The possi-
bility of hidden variable models evading the KS theorem
was first considered by Pitowsky. [8] Meyer [1] has given
a very pretty example of a truth function p defined on the
subset S2∩Q3 of projections defined by rational vectors,
which satisfies (1) for all orthogonal triples. Meyer’s ele-
gant proofs, [1] using earlier work of Godsil and Zaks, [9]
show that all the necessary denseness conditions hold and
hence that the KS proof is indeed nullified if we restrict
attention to finite precision measurements.
Meyer’s result shows that the KS theorem cannot be
directly applied in the finite precision case. However, it
does not imply that the theorem itself is false, or that
no similar no-go theorem can be found. Even in the case
of three dimensional systems, this requires an example
of a truth function that satisfies (1) for a dense subset
of the triads of projections on C3 rather than R3. A
more complete argument requires an example of a phys-
ically sensible truth function satisfying (1) for a dense
subset of the projective decompositions of the identity
on Cn. More generally still, since all physical measure-
ments are actually positive operator valued, a complete
defence against KS-like arguments requires an example
of a physically sensible truth function satisfying (2) for a
dense subset of the positive operator decompositions of
the identity on Cn.
We give such examples here. First, some notation. De-
fine the one-dimensional projection Pr1,...,r2n on C
n to be
the projection onto the vector N(r1 + ir2, . . . , r2n−1 +
ir2n), where the ri are real and not all zero and the
normalisation constant obeys N−2 =
∑2n
i=1 r
2
i . Call
Pr1,...,r2n true if all the ri are rational and non-zero and
if, writing ri = pi/qi we have that q1 is divisible by 3
and none of the other qi are. Here, and throughout, any
fractions we write are taken to be in lowest terms. Call
an n-tuple {Q1, . . . , Qn} of orthogonal one-dimensional
projections suitable if at least one of the Qi is true. If P
belongs to a suitable n-tuple but is not true, call P false.
(Note that a projection need not be either true or false.)
Define p(P ) = 1 if P is true and p(P ) = 0 if P is false.
Lemma 1 A suitable n-tuple contains precisely one
true projection.
Proof If P and Q are both true projections, the
corresponding vectors have inner product of the form
(a/9) + (p/q) + i(r/s), where 3 is not a factor of q. The
real part thus cannot vanish, so P and Q cannot be or-
thogonal.
Lemma 2 The true projections are dense in the
space of all one-dimensional projections.
Proof Given any one-dimensional projection
Pr1,...,r2n we can find an arbitrarily close approximation
Pr′
1
,...,r′
2n
with rational r′i = p
′
i/q
′
i. If q
′
1 is not divisible by
3, we can find an arbitrarily close rational approximation
r′′
1
= p′′
1
/q′′
1
to r′
1
with q′′
1
divisible by 3, for example by
taking p′′1 = 3Np
′
1 + 1 and q
′′
1 = 3Nq
′
1 for a sufficiently
large integer N . Similarly, if any of the q′i for i > 1
are divisible by 3, we can find arbitrarily close rational
approximations r′′i = p
′′
i /q
′′
i to r
′
i with q
′′
i not divisible by
2
3, for example by taking p′′
1
= Np′
1
and q′′
1
= Nq′
1
+1 for
a sufficiently large integer N .
Lemma 3 The suitable n-tuples are dense in the
space of all n-tuples of orthogonal projections.
Proof Given any n-tuple {P1, . . . , Pn}, choose one
of the projections, say P1. As above, we can find an ar-
bitrarily close approximation to P1 by a true projection
Q. Let U be a rotation in SU(n) which rotates P1 to
Q such that |U − I| = (Tr((U − I)(U † − I)))1/2 attains
the minimal value for such rotations. The compactness
of SU(n) ensures that such a U exists, though it need
not be unique, and the minimal value tends to zero as Q
tends towards P . The projections {UP1, . . . , UPn} form
a suitable n-tuple, and this construction gives n-tuples of
this type arbitrarily close to the original.
Lemma 4 The false projections are dense in the
space of all one-dimensional projections.
Proof Given any projection P , choose an n-tuple to
which it belongs, and let Q be another projection in that
n-tuple. By the construction above, we can find arbitrar-
ily close n-tuples in which the projections approximating
Q are true. The projections approximating P are thus
false.
This concludes the argument for measurements defined
by n-tuples of one-dimensional projections. For com-
pleteness, though, we also consider degenerate von Neu-
mann measurements, corresponding to decompositions
of the identity into general orthogonal projections. The
construction above generalises quite simply. Fixing the
basis as before, we can write each projection as a ma-
trix: P = N(aij + ibij)
n
i,j=1, where the aij and bij are
real and N is some normalisation constant. Consistently
with our earlier definitions for one-dimensional projec-
tions, we can define P to be true if it can be written in
this form with all the aij and bij rational and non-zero
and if a11 is then the only one which, when written in
lowest terms, has denominator divisible by 9. Clearly if
P and Q are both true then Tr(PQ) 6= 0, so they cannot
be orthogonal. We can thus define suitable projective de-
compositions and false projections as above, and all the
earlier arguments run through with trivial modifications.
At this stage a comment on measurement theory is
required. The KS theorem assumes the traditional von
Neumann definition of measurement, in which measure-
ment projects the quantum state onto an eigenspace of
the relevant observable. In more realistic modern treat-
ments, a measurement causes an action on the quan-
tum state by positive operators, which may but need not
be close to projections. One could, indeed, realistically
base measurement theory only on positive operator val-
ued measurements in which the positive operators are
not projections, for example stipulating that all positive
operators involved must be of maximal rank. If so, the
original KS theorem becomes irrelevant, though it can
easily be modified to deal with these cases. It seems
more natural, though, to either allow any precisely spec-
ified positive operator decomposition, whether or not it
includes projections, or else to consider general finite pre-
cision positive operator valued measurements. If all pre-
cisely specified positive operators are included, then of
course the KS theorem applies. On the other hand, as
we now show, the finite precision loophole also exists for
positive operator measurements.
We need new definitions for positive operators. Again
fixing a basis, we can write a positive operator as a ma-
trix: A = (aij + ibij)
n
i,j=1, where the aij and bij are real,
so that aij = aji and bij = −bji. We say that A is true
if a11 = r1 + r2
√
2, with r1 and r2 both rational and r2
positive, and that a projective decomposition I =
∑
iAi
of the identity into positive operators is suitable if pre-
cisely one of the Ai is true. A is false if it belongs to a
suitable decomposition but is not true. Under this def-
inition, every A is either true or false. Define the truth
function p by setting p(A) = 1 if A is true and p(A) = 0
if A is false. Clearly p satisfies (2) on suitable decompo-
sitions. Clearly, too, true and false operators are dense
in the space of positive operators, and suitable decom-
positions are dense in the space of all positive operator
decompositions. Hence the desired result holds.
Note that these last definitions, restricted to projec-
tions, give another example of a physically sensible truth
function satisfying (1). The two different constructions
perhaps help to illustrate the large scope for examples of
this sort. There is nothing particularly special about ei-
ther our constructions or those of Ref. [1]: the possibility
of closing the finite precision loophole by any KS-type
argument can be refuted in many different ways.
It follows from the above examples that non-contextual
hidden variable theories cannot be excluded by theoreti-
cal arguments of the KS type once the imprecision in real
world experiments is taken into account. This does not,
of course, imply that such theories are very plausible, or
that the particular constructions we give are capable of
producing a physically interesting hidden variable the-
ory. Nor does the discussion affect the situation regard-
ing local hidden variable theories, which can be refuted
by experiment, modulo reasonable assumptions. [10–12]
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